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Abstract 
Mandevillian intelligence is a specific form of collective intelligence in which individual cognitive 
shortcomings, limitations and biases play a positive functional role in yielding various forms of 
collective cognitive success. When this idea is transposed to the epistemological domain, 
mandevillian intelligence emerges as the idea that individual forms of intellectual vice may, on 
occasion, support the epistemic performance of some form of multi-agent ensemble, such as a 
socio-epistemic system, a collective doxastic agent, or an epistemic group agent. As a specific form 
of collective intelligence, mandevillian intelligence is relevant to a number of debates in social 
epistemology, especially those that seek to understand how group (or collective) knowledge arises 
from the interactions between a collection of individual epistemic agents. Beyond this, however, 
mandevillian intelligence raises issues that are relevant to the research agendas of both virtue 
epistemology and applied epistemology. From a virtue epistemological perspective, mandevillian 
intelligence encourages us to adopt a relativistic conception of intellectual vice/virtue, enabling us to 
see how individual forms of intellectual vice may (sometimes) be relevant to collective forms of 
intellectual virtue. In addition, mandevillian intelligence is relevant to the nascent sub-discipline of 
applied epistemology. In particular, mandevillian intelligence forces us see the potential epistemic 
value of (e.g., technological) interventions that create, maintain or promote individual forms of 
intellectual vice. 
Keywords: social epistemology, virtue epistemology, applied epistemology, collective intelligence, 
virtue reliabilism, virtue responsibilism, collective cognition. 
1. Introduction 
The performance of groups, teams and organizations is a common focus of interest for those 
working in the cognitive (e.g., Hutchins, 1995), computational (e.g., Kearns, 2012) and social (e.g., 
Kerr and Tindale, 2004) sciences. It is also an increasingly popular focus of interest for those working 
in epistemology. The sub-discipline of social epistemology, for example, seeks, at least in part, to 
understand the way in which issues of social structure, social organization, social practice and socio-
technical interaction affect the collective generation of epistemically-relevant commodities, such as 
true belief, knowledge and understanding (Goldman, 2011). Given that many of our most cherished 
intellectual accomplishments (e.g., advances in scientific knowledge) are typically forged in these 
crucibles of collective effort, it is vital that we develop a better (meta-epistemological?) 
understanding of the forces and factors that affect the outcomes of socio-epistemic interactions. 
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It might be thought that the best way to enhance the epistemic performance of social groups would 
be to enhance the cognitive or epistemic capabilities of the individual group members. This makes 
intuitive sense, since it would seem that by improving the cognitive abilities of individual agents 
(e.g., by enhancing their powers of mnemonic recall or improving their ability to engage in reason-
respecting chains of thought) we thereby provide the basis for improved performance at the 
collective level (i.e., we enhance the problem-solving and decision-making capabilities of the group 
itself). This intuitive view of the relationship between individual ability and collective performance is 
challenged by the notion of mandevillian intelligence.1 The term “mandevillian intelligence” names a 
specific form of collective intelligence in which certain kinds of (individual-level) cognitive and 
epistemic properties are seen to be causally-relevant to the expression of intelligent behaviour at 
the collective level. In particular, the properties of interest in mandevillian intelligence are ones that 
are typically denigrated as cognitive or epistemic ‘vices’. These include cognitive processing 
limitations (e.g., limitations in attentional capacity), cognitive shortcomings (e.g., forgetting) and 
cognitive biases (e.g., confirmation bias). What makes these properties vices is that they are 
generally seen to undermine the performance of the individual on a variety of cognitive and 
epistemic tasks.  
With these clarifications in place, mandevillian intelligence can be defined as follows: 
Mandevillian Intelligence 
Mandevillian intelligence is a specific form of collective intelligence in which 
cognitive and epistemic properties that are typically seen as vices at the 
individual level can, on occasion, play a positive functional role in supporting the 
emergence of intelligent behaviour at the collective level. 
There are few points that are worth noting about this definition. Firstly, mandevillian intelligence is 
cast as a specific form of collective intelligence. As such, it only applies to situations where the term 
“collective intelligence” is itself deemed to be applicable. We do not, therefore, have mandevillian 
intelligence if we observe the presence of cognitive vice (or virtue), but we do not observe collective 
intelligence.2 Secondly, mandevillian intelligence is only applicable to those situations in which 
collective success is causally linked to individual properties that are properly labelled as cognitive or 
epistemic vices. If the relevant properties fail to qualify as vices (from the perspective of individual 
cognitive functioning), then we do not have mandevillian intelligence. Finally, it is important to note 
that there is nothing in the definition of mandevillian intelligence that would lead us to conclude 
that individual forms of cognitive/epistemic vice will inexorably lead to positive outcomes at the 
collective level: it is perfectly possible for individual cognitive vices to undermine or enhance 
collective performance depending on the specific context in which collective cognitive processing 
occurs. 
The value of the concept of mandevillian intelligence is that it forces us to acknowledge the potential 
role of individual vice in securing collective forms of cognitive success. With the concept of 
mandevillian intelligence to hand we can thus question the extent to which the seemingly negative 
                                                          
1 Mandevillian intelligence is named after the Anglo-Dutch philosopher and economist, Bernard Mandeville, 
who wrote about the causal link between private (individual) vice and public (collective) benefits. 
2 It is thus a mistake to regard situations where individual virtues undermine collective intelligence as genuine 
instances of mandevillian intelligence. This is because the relevant situations are not ones that can be seen as 
indicative of collective intelligence. 
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or undesirable cognitive properties of individual agents (broadly construed as cognitive vices) should 
always be seen as detrimental to group performance. Indeed, mandevillian intelligence encourages 
us to entertain the possibility that individual cognitive vices may, on occasion, provide a productive 
route to collective forms of ‘cognitive virtue’. In other words, mandevillian intelligence enables us to 
see how individual vices may sometimes yield group-level properties that enable the group to 
discover or track the truth. 
The main aim of the present chapter is to introduce the notion of mandevillian intelligence to the 
epistemology community. In particular, I will attempt to sketch an initial vision concerning the 
potential relevance of mandevillian intelligence to contemporary epistemology. Of course, given that 
mandevillian intelligence is presented as a specific form of collective intelligence, it should be clear 
that mandevillian intelligence is of potential relevance to the branch of epistemology known as 
social epistemology (Goldman and Whitcomb, 2011; Haddock et al, 2010). Beyond this, however, 
mandevillian intelligence may also strike a chord with popular approaches in individualistic analytic 
epistemology. This is because issues of vice and virtue, which lie at the heart of mandevillian 
intelligence, are a major focus of philosophical attention for what is known as virtue epistemology 
(Greco and Turri, 2012). Mandevillian intelligence seems to be of crucial relevance, here, because it 
suggests that a virtue-theoretic conception of socially-produced knowledge (or collective 
knowledge) might need to appeal to the role of intellectual vice as much as it does the role of 
intellectual virtue. There are also reasons to believe that a consideration of mandevillian intelligence 
is relevant to the design and evaluation of socio-technical systems, especially those that have, as 
their primary goal, the generation or maintenance of collective knowledge. With the advent of the 
World Wide Web, such forms of socio-epistemic ‘machinery’ are increasingly commonplace. 
Prominent examples include the online encyclopedia, Wikipedia (see Fallis, 2011), as well as a 
variety of so-called citizen science systems (Khatib et al, 2011; Lintott et al, 2008). Given the 
potential relevance of contemporary epistemology to the design of these systems, it seems that 
mandevillian intelligence may have as much traction with the emerging sub-discipline of applied 
epistemology (Chase and Coady, forthcoming) as it does with the already well-established sub-
disciplines of social epistemology and virtue epistemology. 
2. Virtue Epistemology: Reliabilism, Responsibilism and Virtue 
Relativism 
As a means of better understanding the epistemological relevance of mandevillian intelligence, it 
helps to have a better understanding of the significance of vice and virtue in contemporary 
epistemology. The main point of interest, here, is what is known as virtue epistemology (Greco and 
Turri, 2012). Virtue epistemology names an approach to understanding knowledge that is rooted in 
the intellectual virtues, where these are understood as the properties of an agent that enable the 
agent to track the truth. The thing that makes something an intellectual virtue from an 
epistemological perspective is thus its truth conduciveness, or its tendency to lead to a 
preponderance of true (as opposed to false) beliefs. 
A point of agreement between all virtue epistemologists concerns the role of intellectual virtue in 
underwriting claims regarding positive epistemic status. Virtue epistemologists have, however, 
tended to think of the intellectual virtues themselves in different ways. It is, in fact, this difference 
that enables us to distinguish between two major theoretical camps in contemporary virtue 
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epistemology, namely, virtue reliabilism and virtue responsibilism (Baehr, 2006; Battaly, 2008; 
Greco, 2002). According to virtue reliabilists, the intellectual virtues are to be understood as 
cognitive abilities or powers. Examples include memory, perception, and various forms of reasoning 
(e.g., inductive and deductive reasoning). Given that we can regard these abilities or powers as 
cognitive faculties, virtue reliabilists are sometimes said to embrace a faculty-based conception of 
intellectual virtue (e.g., Greco, 2002). In contrast to virtue reliabilists, virtue responsibilists see the 
intellectual virtues as something akin to personality traits. Examples, in this case, include open-
mindedness, tenacity, attentiveness, intellectual courage, carefulness, thoroughness, and so on. 
Given the sense in which these properties correspond to enduring cognitive traits, reflecting 
(perhaps) an agent’s cognitive character,3 virtue responsibilists are sometimes said to adopt a trait-
based conception of intellectual virtue (see Figure 1). 
Based on the foregoing characterization of virtue reliabilism and virtue responsibilism, it is perhaps 
easy to think of vice and virtue as fixed and immutable aspects of an agent’s cognitive character. It 
is, in other words, easy to think that examples of vice (e.g., a poor memory) and virtue (e.g., open-
mindedness) are always to be seen as vices and virtues, irrespective of the specific context in which 
these aspects of agent character are evaluated. This seems entirely appropriate; for why assume 
that something like a poor memory should, in some cases, be regarded as a vice and, in other cases, 
as a virtue. Similarly, it seems odd to think that a trait such as open-mindedness could ever be 
anything other than an intellectual virtue: surely it is always better to be open-minded as opposed to 
dogmatic, particularly if one’s goal is to increase one’s chances of believing the truth. 
                                                          
3 The notion of cognitive character also surfaces in the context of virtue reliabilist approaches to knowledge 
(see Greco, 1999). In the current context, cognitive character consists of both faculty virtues and trait virtues 
(see Figure 1). It is important to note, however, that virtue reliabilists and virtue responsibilists are likely to 
view the notion of cognitive character in somewhat different ways. From a virtue reliabilist perspective, an 
agent’s cognitive character is to be understood in terms of an “integrated web of stable and reliable belief-
forming processes” (Pritchard, 2010, p. 136). For virtue responsibilists, in contrast, the notion of cognitive 
character is likely to refer to the dispositions of the agent to cognize in particular ways given certain situations. 
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Figure 1: Virtue reliabilism and virtue responsibilism can be seen to appeal to distinct conceptions of 
intellectual virtue. Both kinds of intellectual virtue, in this case, are seen to form part of what is called an 
agent’s “cognitive character.” Triangles in this diagram symbolize taxonomic (or sub-type-of) relationships, 
while diamonds symbolize compositional (or part-of) relationships. 
But now notice something important. Recall that what makes something an intellectual virtue in 
virtue epistemology is its reliability—the fact that it leads to a preponderance of true rather than 
false beliefs. Intellectual vices, on the other hand, are properties of an epistemic agent that are 
generally seen to be unreliable (i.e., they do not result in a preponderance of true beliefs). The 
reason why we regard open-mindedness as a virtue, therefore, has something to do with the fact 
that open-mindedness will, in general, yield a greater number of true beliefs, as opposed to a trait 
like dogmatism, which will yield a preponderance of false beliefs. But what if the reliability of these 
aspects of agent cognitive character were to vary in a systematic way with different kinds of belief-
forming context? In this case, it is at least possible that a vice in one context of evaluation might 
have a more virtuous feel to it in another context of evaluation. 
It is here that we come face-to-face with the notion of what I will call virtue relativism. Virtue 
relativism is the idea that our notions of vice and virtue are relative to specific evaluative contexts. 
Intellectual Virtue
Faculty Virtue Trait Virtue
Virtue 
Reliabilism
Virtue 
Responsibilism
appeals-to appeals-to
Intellectual Humility
Intellectual Courage
Openmindedness
Curiosity
Memory
Perception
Induction
Deduction
is-property-of is-property-of
Epistemic Agent
Cognitive 
Character
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Our judgements of vice and virtue thus exhibit a degree of context-specificity: what we see as a vice 
or virtue is largely determined by the sort of context in which such judgements are made. Such 
issues lie at the heart of mandevillian intelligence. In the case of mandevillian intelligence, the 
context of evaluation (the context in which we make judgements concerning vice and virtue) relates 
to whether our focus is on an individual epistemic agent or a larger collection of such agents, for 
example, a socio-epistemic system (Goldman, 2011) or an epistemic group agent (Palermos, 2015).4 
In particular, when we apply the notion of mandevillian intelligence to virtue epistemology, the 
claim is that our sense of what is and what is not an intellectual vice varies according to whether our 
attention is focused on an individual agent (the traditional focus of analytic epistemology) or a 
collection of such agents (the traditional focus of social epistemology). As a  result, a cognitive trait 
or faculty that has a distinctly vice-like feel to it at the individual level of analysis may, when studied 
in a more collective context, emerge as something rather more virtuous. In most cases, we can make 
sense of this by focusing our attention on the way in which a cognitive property (i.e., a trait or 
faculty) contributes to the reliability of a belief-forming process. Thus, when we consider the 
reliability of a cognitive trait or faculty at the individual level of analysis, we may observe that a trait 
such as dogmatism (i.e., an irrational adherence to one’s views) is to be regarded as a cognitive vice. 
We may be perfectly justified in making this sort of judgement, since dogmatism may indeed 
undermine the ability of an individual agent to believe what is true (i.e., at the individual level 
dogmatism is to be regarded as a genuine intellectual vice). When our perspective shifts, however, 
and we view things from a more social perspective, we may find that individual forms of dogmatism 
play a productive role in yielding collective forms of epistemic success (see Section 3.2). Indeed, it 
may very well be the case that a degree of dogmatism on the part of individual agents is necessary 
to ensure the reliability of the larger socio-epistemic system with respect to the generation or 
discovery of true beliefs.5 It is in precisely this sense that we can see the notion of mandevillian 
intelligence as appealing to a particular form of virtue relativism. 
3. My Vice, Our Virtue 
Claims regarding mandevillian intelligence would, if true, seem to have a number of implications for 
contemporary epistemology. Clearly, given the centrality of vice and virtue to virtue epistemology, 
we would expect the notion of mandevillian intelligence to inform philosophical debates concerning 
the nature of knowledge. This seems particularly so when it comes to virtue-theoretic conceptions of 
group (or collective) knowledge (Palermos and Pritchard, 2013; Palermos, 2015). In this case, a 
collection of individual agents is deemed to function as a form of doxastic machinery, generating 
belief states that (hopefully) succeed in tracking the truth. Looking at such socio-epistemic systems 
from the perspective of virtue epistemology, we might be inclined to view collective knowledge as 
grounded in the intellectual virtues of the individual agents that comprise the system. Such a view, 
however, seems to be called into question if we accept the notion of mandevillian intelligence (see 
Section 4.3). 
                                                          
4 Epistemic group agents are defined as “groups of individuals who exist and gain knowledge in virtue of a 
shared common cognitive character that primarily consists of a distributed cognitive ability” (Palermos and 
Pritchard, 2013, p. 115). 
5 This does not mean that all individuals within the collective ensemble are required to be dogmatic. In many 
cases, a mixture of individuals possessing both positive and negative traits is likely to be required. Support for 
this claim is provided by empirical research showing that agent diversity is sometimes crucial to collective 
forms of cognitive success (Hong and Page, 2004; Muldoon, 2013; Page, 2007). 
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The implications of mandevillian intelligence may also be felt in the context of what is called applied 
epistemology (Chase and Coady, forthcoming). In this case, the objective is often to evaluate the 
epistemic impact of different forms of social or technological intervention. Inasmuch as we embrace 
the notion of mandevillian intelligence, it seems we may need to accept that what is epistemically 
good for the community (in the form of a specific social or technological intervention) may not 
always be so good for the epistemic standing of the community members (see Section 4.1). 
There are thus a variety of reasons to think that mandevillian intelligence is of broad relevance to a 
number of areas in contemporary epistemology. But why should we buy into the notion of 
mandevillian intelligence in the first place? What evidence is there to suggest that the notion of 
mandevillian intelligence denotes a real phenomenon that is worthy of further epistemological 
consideration. In this section, I will review a number of strands of research that provide an initial 
response to this question. 
3.1. Collective Intelligence and Collective Search 
Mandevillian intelligence, recall, is defined as a specific form of collective intelligence (see Section 1). 
This is important, because from an empirical perspective it is common to see collective intelligence 
as a form of collective search through a complex space of (e.g.) doxastic possibilities (e.g., Mason, 
2013). Consider, for example, the case of collective (or team) sensemaking (Klein et al, 2010; Smart 
and Sycara, 2013). As a team of individuals strives to make sense of some ambiguous body of 
information, they will each start to form beliefs about the focal object, event or situation. Such 
beliefs can be seen as tracing trajectories through a multi-dimensional space of interpretational 
possibilities, each of which can be judged in terms of its relative distance to a particular point in the 
search (or problem) space that represents the global optimum, i.e., the set of beliefs that 
corresponds to the most accurate interpretation of the target state-of-affairs. The performance of 
the team members, in this case, can be judged in terms of their ability to discover (and, in some 
cases, converge) on the global optimum. A similar characterization could be made in respect of the 
process of scientific discovery. Here, a community of scientists are typically engaged in a collective 
effort to generate ideas and evaluate them with respect to the available evidence. The hope is that 
as the community explores this space of ideational possibilities they will (eventually) discover 
regions or points within the space that mark out major advances in scientific knowledge and 
understanding. 
Relative to this vision of collective intelligence as a form of collective search, we can view 
mandevillian intelligence as a form of collective intelligence that is apparent whenever individual 
vices play a positive functional role in supporting a collective search effort. In other words, we 
confront a case of mandevillian intelligence whenever individual vices contribute to the ability of a 
community to discover optimal solutions (e.g., doxastic states that closely approximate the nature of 
reality). These vices, we can assume, work to shape the flow of information and influence within an 
agent community in such a way as to alter the dynamics of the collective search process, enhancing 
the probability that the community (as a whole) will discover the best available solution. Transposing 
all this to the epistemic domain, we can see mandevillian intelligence as a form of collective 
intelligence in which individual vices enhance the reliability of a community to discover (and 
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sometimes converge on) those beliefs (i.e., a region of some possibly multidimensional doxastic 
space) that provides the community with an appropriate cognitive grip on reality.6 
The value of thinking about mandevillian intelligence in this sort of way is that it helps to establish 
contact with an important body of empirical work concerning the optimal organization of multi-
agent ensembles as a means of improving various aspects of the collective search process. Such 
work appears under a variety of headings based on the complexity (i.e., simple vs. complex) and 
nature (i.e., biological vs. computational) of the focal group of agents. Work involving relatively 
simply agents thus includes work on swarm intelligence (Bonabeau et al, 1999; Garnier et al, 2007; 
Kennedy et al, 2001) (biological agents) and particle swarm optimization (Poli et al, 2007) 
(computational agents), whereas work involving more complex agents includes work on human 
subjects (Mason et al, 2008) (biological agents) and cognitive architectures (Reitter and Lebiere, 
2012) (computational agents). 
One of the key insights to emerge from work in these areas is the importance of balancing what is 
called exploration and exploitation (March, 1991). In general, the agent community needs to ensure 
that it engages in a sufficient degree of exploration of the search space, avoiding the temptation to 
converge on those regions of the search space marked out by early discoveries. The problem is that, 
especially in complex search spaces characterized by rugged solution landscapes, precipitant forms 
of inter-agent communication can sometimes lead to premature convergence on sub-optimal 
solutions, thereby blocking the search for the global optimum. This is a particular problem in 
situations where early successes are of little value in terms of illuminating the path to the best 
outcome. It is for this reason that attempts to improve the efficiency of inter-agent communication 
by, for example, increasing the density of the agent communication network, tend to compromise 
performance on collective cognitive tasks (Hutchins, 1991; Lazer and Friedman, 2007; Mason et al, 
2008; Smart et al, 2010; Zollman, 2010). The problem is that certain kinds of communication (or 
social) network structure (e.g., fully-connected networks) provide rapid feedback (possibly to all 
agents) about the best solutions on offer. This has the unfortunate consequence of causing all 
agents to converge on regions of the search space that are possibly far removed from the actual 
location of the global optimum (see Lazer and Friedman, 2007, for more details). 
One way of addressing this unfortunate state-of-affairs is to reduce the opportunities that agents 
have to communicate information during the search process. By reducing the opportunities for 
communication, we alter the temporal dynamics of information flow and influence, thereby 
retarding the rate at which information can propagate within the agent community and reducing the 
possibility of premature forms of cognitive convergence. One way of restricting agent 
communication is, of course, to alter the physical structure of the agent communication network 
itself. By reducing the number of channels for inter-agent communication, changes to network 
structure often succeed in ensuring that a felicitous degree of cognitive (e.g., doxastic) diversity is 
maintained within the agent community, and it is for this reason that we can view alterations to 
network structure as a form of diversity maintenance mechanism, i.e., as a mechanism that works to 
maintain cognitive diversity within a community of problem-solving agents. 
                                                          
6 In practice, of course, such forms of reliability will always be judged relative to a set of resource constraints 
relating to (e.g.) time, cost, money, effort and so on. 
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Changes to the physical structure of a communication network are not, however, the only way to 
alter the flow of information and influence within a community of agents. We can also look to agent-
level characteristics as a means of gating and routing information through the collective ensemble. 
Individual agents, in this case, can be seen as working to control the time-variant “effective 
connectivity” of the communication network (see Friston, 2011) (i.e., the set of connections that are 
actively engaged in the transfer of information between the nodal elements—in this case, agents). 
As a means of illustrating this, imagine that we bring together a group of (human) individuals to 
perform a collective sensemaking task. Imagine, also, that these individuals have no prior experience 
of working together and are thus unknown to each other. The level of trust between the agents is, 
we may assume, relatively low, and each agent will, as a result, be initially reluctant to 
wholeheartedly embrace the information supplied by other agents (at least during the early stages 
of the task). The result is that the effective influence of communicated information, in terms of its 
ability to promote a shift in agent-level cognitive states, is limited. In fact, it may very well be the 
case that the informational influence is so low as to transform what is (at the structural level) a fully-
connected network into something that, at least from the perspective of effective connectivity, looks 
a lot more austere (e.g., a disconnected network). It is in this sense that we can see a role for inter-
agent distrust (an agent-level property) in shaping the effective connectivity of an agent 
communication network. Crucially, we can see this agent-mediated transformation of effective 
connectivity as a form of diversity maintenance mechanism that helps (just as do changes to the 
structural connectivity of the network) to prevent premature convergence on sub-optimal solutions. 
In the case of human epistemic communities there are a variety of psycho-cognitive factors that are 
poised to play the same sort of functional role as that played by inter-agent (i.e., social) distrust. 
These include the tendency of individuals to hoard information, a lack of willingness to cooperate 
with others, a vulnerability to copying/transmission errors, and a steadfast (and seemingly irrational) 
commitment to one’s own ideas and methods. What is important to note, here, is that these factors 
are often cast in a somewhat negative light: they are often seen as shortcomings, flaws or 
vulnerabilities that need to be addressed by all manner of social, pedagogical and technological 
interventions. It is here, then, that we begin to creep up on the notion of mandevillian intelligence. 
In particular, we can begin to see at least one of the ways in which a set of vice-like characteristics 
pitched at the level of individual agents could make a positive contribute to the cognitive processing 
capabilities of a collective ensemble. Relative to our intuitions regarding the importance and value of 
cooperation, sharing, trust and accurate information transmission, it might be all too easy to take a 
rather dim view of distrust, hoarding, deception and social withdrawal. What the notion of 
mandevillian intelligence gives us, however, is an alternative way of looking at these individual, 
agent-level properties: it enables us to see agent-level characteristics as playing an important (i.e., 
explanatorily salient) role in helping to align the structure of the collective search effort with the 
demands imposed by the nature of the search problem. 
3.2. Dogmatism 
While a failure to trust others is hardly the most celebrated of human characteristics, it is not 
something that is typically regarded as an intellectual vice, at least by virtue epistemologists. 
Intellectual vices, we have seen, are those properties of an agent’s cognitive character that 
undermine the extent to which an agent’s beliefs align themselves with facts about the world. A vice 
is thus something that hinders an agent’s ability to believe the truth. Given that it is far from clear 
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that the kinds of properties we have been talking about thus far—i.e., distrust, hoarding and 
deception—really do undermine the truth-tracking capabilities of individual agents, there seems 
little reason for virtue epistemologists to be convinced about the relevance of mandevillian 
intelligence to epistemological theorizing. In order to make the case for mandevillian intelligence we 
therefore need to focus on agent-level properties that are widely recognized as intellectual vices and 
show how such properties can work to the good of an epistemic community. 
With this in mind, consider the results of an important study by Zollman (2010). Zollman was 
interested in the factors that work to facilitate cognitive diversity within a scientific community, 
enabling the community to more fully explore a space of possibilities before converging on a 
particular outcome. One way of achieving such diversity is, as we have seen, to manipulate the 
structural configuration of the agent communication network and thereby constrain the 
opportunities that agents have to exchange information (and thus influence one another). But what 
if we are unable to change the structure of the network? In this situation it seems as though there is 
nothing to prevent precipitant forms of information sharing, and we might thus expect the agent 
community to prematurely converge on some sub-optimal part of the search space. 
Although restricting the flow of information (e.g., the dissemination of research results) constitutes 
one means of avoiding premature convergence in this situation, Zollman identifies another way. If 
we are stuck with a community of well-connected scientists, diversity can still be maintained, he 
suggests, if (at least some of) the scientists exhibit a dogmatic adherence to their own ideas and 
methods. By being dogmatic, a scientist is essentially insulating themselves from the influence 
exerted by conflicting evidence. The result, Zollman suggests, is that the scientific community 
manages to maintain the sort of cognitive diversity that is required to ensure that scientific 
consensus, when it does finally emerge, is successful in settling on the truth. 
By appealing to the role of dogmatism in maintaining a sufficient degree of cognitive diversity, 
Zollman (2010) is clearly identifying a positive functional role for aspects of human cognitive 
character that are typically seen in a somewhat negative light. From an individual perspective it 
seems highly unlikely that an irrational adherence to one’s own ideas could be of epistemic value, 
especially when ideas with seemingly better evidential support are on offer. Nevertheless, such 
forms of individual vice can, it seems, work to the good of an epistemic community by reducing the 
impact of misleading evidence and sustaining the search for new ideas, methods and information. 
The upshot is that a moderate amount of individual vice—in this case, intellectual dogmatism—
seems to play an important role in striking an effective balance between exploration and 
exploitation. By exhibiting a steadfast commitment to one’s own ideas, individual epistemic agents 
(e.g., scientists) look to be behaving in a decidedly sub-optimal manner. However, such 
shortcomings are only really apparent at the individual level of analysis. At the collective level, 
individual vice seems to play a much more positive role in facilitating collective forms of cognitive 
and epistemic success. 
There are, in fact, a variety of ways in which intellectual dogmatism might work to the epistemic 
good of a community. Most obviously, a resistance to social and informational influence helps to 
maintain a degree of cognitive diversity within a community of problem solvers. We can thus see 
dogmatism as something of an intellectual safeguard against pernicious forms of cognitive 
convergence and consensus, especially in situations where it is important to avoid the premature 
11 
 
abandonment of potentially promising lines of enquiry. Another way in which dogmatism might earn 
its collective cognitive keep is via the ‘social scaffolding’ of intellectual activities. Consider, for 
example, how the maintenance of marginal theories and ideas might help to concentrate and 
reinforce the empirical and deliberative efforts of those who embrace the majority view. Here, the 
presence of minority views (even if those views are incorrect!) helps to motivate others to develop 
their own views and make them even more convincing (see Nemeth and Wachtler, 1983). In the 
absence of such opposition, it is perhaps unlikely that there would be sufficient motivation to 
engage in these additional forms of intellectual effort.7 Finally, note that by preserving some degree 
of diversity within an epistemic community, dogmatism plays a potentially important role in opening 
the door to further diversity. In situations where all the members of a community have settled on a 
particular view, it may be difficult for those with a dissenting voice to pluck up sufficient courage to 
challenge the status quo. Here, the presence of one or two dogmatic individuals may establish a 
baseline level of dissent that helps to free the timid champions of competing views from the 
pressures of social conformity.  
Note that in many of these cases there is no reason for the dogmatist to actually believe the truth—
it may very well be the case that what the dogmatist believes to be the truth is, in fact, false. This 
does not mean, however, that dogmatic individuals cannot (on occasion) play a useful and 
productive role in enabling the community as a whole to succeed in their truth-seeking efforts.8 
3.3. Cognitive Bias 
Dogmatism provides one means by which cognitive diversity could be maintained within an 
epistemic community. Another route to cognitive diversity may have its origins in our susceptibility 
to cognitive bias. Consider, for example, Solomon’s (1992) analysis of the plate tectonics revolution 
in geology. Solomon suggests that the eventual success of theories relating to continental drift owed 
a great deal to a set of cognitive heuristics and biases that are often seen as a threat to rational 
forms of thought and action. Contrary to what might be expected, Solomon argues it was the 
departure from normative standards of rationality that, in fact, made possible the intellectual 
success of the larger geological community: 
...during the geological revolution, the phenomena of bias and belief 
perseverance were responsible for much of the distribution of research 
commitment. This distribution facilitated the various directions of research effort 
that went into the geological revolution. So the cognitive heuristics of availability, 
salience and representativeness had desirable epistemic effects in the geological 
community. (Solomon, 1992, p. 452) 
Crucially, for our purposes, the kinds of factors that Solomon draws attention to in accounting for 
the success of the geological community are factors that are typically denigrated as forms of 
                                                          
7 Something along these lines was recognized by Karl Popper (1994). With respect to dogmatism, Popper 
(1994) notes that: “...a limited amount of dogmatism is necessary for progress. Without a serious struggle for 
survival in which the old theories are tenaciously defended, none of the competing theories can show their 
mettle—that is, their explanatory power and their truth content” (p. 16). 
8 Note how all this this encourages us to embrace a form of epistemic tolerance with respect to those who we 
would otherwise seek to censure, denounce or condemn (Robert Clowes, personal communication, October 7, 
2016). Inasmuch as we accept the possibility the mandevillian intelligence, we are perhaps able to see the 
(collective) epistemic value of those who are widely recognized as the purveyors of false beliefs. 
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intellectual vice, or at least as factors that often work to undermine the epistemic integrity of 
individual agents. Here, then, we encounter an additional reason to think that the notion of 
mandevillian intelligence has a substantive impact on contemporary epistemological debates 
relating to both individual analytic epistemology (most notably, virtue epistemology) and social 
epistemology. Whereas our earlier discussion of dogmatism focused on a form of vice that lies in the 
philosophical cross-hairs of virtue responsibilist theorizing, we are now presented with a vice that 
seems to be of greater interest and relevance to virtue reliabilism. In particular, a susceptibility to 
cognitive bias seems to represent something of a failing with regard to the proper functioning of our 
cognitive machinery—it is, at least, something that seems to pose a threat to our cognitively-
grounded truth-tracking capabilities. The value of Solomon’s contribution, in this respect, is that it 
helps to highlight the explanatory significance of degraded forms of individual cognitive ability in 
underwriting the epistemic accomplishments of a larger epistemic community. 
Another significant contribution to this debate comes from a consideration of a specific kind of 
cognitive bias, namely, confirmation bias (Nickerson, 1998). Confirmation bias is almost universally 
seen as a cognitive vice, and this is reflected in the many (ongoing) attempts to develop 
technological interventions that aim to minimize or eliminate the bias (e.g., Convertino et al, 2008). 
A more positive appraisal of confirmation bias is, however, possible if we see confirmation bias as 
(again) a form of diversity maintenance mechanism. Thus while confirmation bias might appear 
(genuinely so) as an individual shortcoming (an individual vice), the bias can also, at least in some 
circumstances, work to ensure the optimal distribution of available cognitive resources within a 
community of epistemic agents. In order to help us understand this, imagine that we have a group of 
individuals who are trying to make sense of some complex state-of-affairs. Providing that we have a 
sufficient degree of cognitive diversity (represented as differences in beliefs, opinions, theories, 
approaches, or whatever) between the agents at the outset of the problem-solving endeavour, then 
we can assume that each agent will (under the influence of confirmation bias) attempt to marshal 
support for their own argumentative positions (see Mercier and Sperber, 2011). The result is that 
each agent, operating under the influence of confirmation bias, will devote considerable effort to 
processing a specific subset of the information (e.g., empirical data) that is available within the 
relevant problem space. This helps to promote the distribution of collective cognitive resources with 
respect to the target problem. Given that cognitive assets (as well as other resources such as time) 
are invariably limited, it helps if each individual agent engages in a thorough exploration of a specific 
and distinct part of the problem space rather than have all agents attempt to cognitively engage 
with the entire space. Not only is this latter strategy likely to be infeasible, it is also likely to be highly 
ineffective. This is because each agent will only be able to process information at a rather superficial 
level. By contrast, when each agent is attempting to bolster support for their own argumentative 
position or preferred interpretation, they will be encouraged to restrict their attention to a much 
more limited body of information (specifically, that body of information that is consistent with their 
own particular point of view) and process this information to a much greater depth than would 
otherwise be the case. 
When we look at this state-of-affairs from an epistemological standpoint, the behaviour of the 
individual agents looks far from optimal. This is particularly so when we look at the situation through 
the lens of virtue epistemology. In this case, the biased nature of each of the individual agents seems 
to undermine their status as genuine knowers. A susceptibility to confirmation bias thus seems to 
undermine the reliability of the individual agent in terms of their ability to track the truth, and it is 
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therefore difficult, under a virtue-theoretic conception of knowledge, to see the individual agent as 
the appropriate target of knowledge ascriptions. Note that even if a particular agent, in this 
situation, turns out to believe the truth, it is far from clear that a virtue reliabilist conception of 
knowledge will allow us to make any sort of positive statement about the epistemic standing of the 
agent. In fact, given the nature of the belief forming processes employed by the agents, it seems 
more a question of luck (as opposed to cognitive ability) that any individual agent will hit on the 
correct answer.9 Individual epistemic successes, if there are any, will thus be seen to violate an 
epistemic anti-luck condition (Pritchard, 2009, 2012), and this is almost universally regarded as 
inimical to knowledge attribution. The result is that we seem to confront a curious state-of-affairs in 
which a susceptibility to cognitive bias undermines positive epistemic standing in the case of 
individual agents, but the same susceptibility to bias underwrites the intellectually virtuous 
character of the larger, multi-agent ensemble. It is after all plausible that the reliability of the agent 
community (i.e., the ability of the community to discover the truth) is rooted in the fact that the 
relevant search space has been explored to the greatest extent possible, and such forms of 
exploratory effort seem to be best enabled by ensuring an appropriate distribution of individual-
level cognitive resources. We might therefore judge whether a community can be said to know 
something on the basis of whether the community’s doxastic outputs stem from the exercise of a 
form of collective cognitive ability—a form of ability that, in this case, appears to be grounded in the 
biased nature of the individual members’ belief-forming processes. 
3.4. Impure Motives 
In addition to cognitive traits (e.g., intellectual dogmatism) and cognitive faculties (e.g., cognitive 
bias), agent motivations have sometimes been shown to yield mandevillian-like effects. Perhaps the 
clearest demonstration of this is apparent in the philosophy of science literature. Here, there has 
been a concerted effort to understand the ways in which socio-cultural factors, such as economic 
rewards and credit assignment policies, influence decisions regarding (e.g.) what scientific topics are 
worth investigating. A particular focus of attention has been the factors that prevent scientists from 
converging on the same area of investigation. This has been deemed to constitute a problem, since if 
we assume that all scientists are perfectly rational and care only about the epistemic payoffs of their 
endeavours (which seems like the virtuous thing do), then there seems little reason to believe that 
scientists will choose to distribute their scientific efforts across a range of different focus areas. The 
result, as noted by Thagard (1993), is a potentially ruinous retreat from novelty: 
...if all scientists made identical judgements about the quality of available 
theories and the value of possible research programs, science would become 
homogenous. Novel ideas and potentially acceptable new theories would never 
be developed sufficiently to the point where they would in fact become rationally 
acceptable by all. (p. 65) 
In order to achieve an effective division of labour it therefore seems that the interests of scientists 
need to be guided by more than just epistemic criteria. It is here that an appeal to sullied motives 
comes into play. For if we reject the image of scientists as epistemically pure-minded individuals and 
instead adopt the (surely far more plausible) image of scientists as preoccupied with a range of non-
                                                          
9 Much, of course, will depend on where an agent happens to focus their intellectual efforts at the outset of 
the search process; however, this may be down to luck as much as anything else. 
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epistemic concerns (e.g., economic rewards, academic prestige and social status), then it seems 
natural to assume that scientists will avoid attempting to hit epistemic pay dirt in those parts of the 
intellectual landscape that are already the focus of significant scientific mining operations. It is this 
general idea that underlies claims about the value of sullied motives in enabling a community to 
achieve its epistemic ends (see Kitcher, 1993). Weisberg and Muldoon (2009) thus suggest that: 
...scientist’s micromotives can look epistemically impure or shortsighted, yet 
these motives can actually help the community as a whole make rapid progress 
toward finding out the truth. Thus a core tenant [sic.] of strategic models about 
the division of cognitive labor is that what is epistemically good for individuals 
may differ from what is epistemically good for the community. (pp. 226–227) 
There is clearly something of a mandevillian ring to all this. But where should we seek to locate 
research on agent motivations within the theoretical framework of virtue epistemology? The best 
answer to that question, to my mind, is to see work on agent motivation (and perhaps emotion10) as 
appealing to a virtue responsibilist conception of knowledge. The reason for this, I suggest, is that 
agent motivations are better conceived as a form of cognitive trait rather than a form of cognitive 
faculty. Motivations are, at least, closer to the sort of characteristics targeted by virtue 
responsibilists than the sort of characteristics targeted by virtue reliabilists. Indeed, virtue 
responsibilists like Zagzebski (1996) often appeal to the role of agent motivations in guiding 
evaluations of epistemic standing. For Zagzebski (1996), all intellectual virtues are to be understood 
as acquired traits of character that involve both a motivational component and a reliability 
component: 
An act of intellectual virtue A is an act that arises from the motivational 
component of A, is something a person with virtue A would (probably) do in the 
circumstances, is successful in achieving the end of the A motivation, and is such 
that the agent acquires a true belief...through these features of the act. (p. 270) 
There is, however, a potentially significant difference between agent motivations and agent 
cognitive traits. Motivations, I suggest, are the sorts of things that are deeply affected by a complex 
nexus of social, cultural, economic, legislative and organizational influences. It is thus relatively easy 
to see how the motivations of individual scientists could be shaped and sustained as a result of the 
delicate interplay between socio-cultural factors, the structure of economic rewards, and the ethical 
norms and values associated with scientific practice. It is here that issues of mandevillian intelligence 
start to dovetail with issues of social policy and the socio-economic scaffolding of epistemic virtue. 
For inasmuch as we accept the idea that individual vice can, on occasion, play a productive role in 
serving the collective epistemic good, then we will need to consider to what extent socio-economic 
and socio-political interventions should be judged solely on the basis of their potential to exacerbate 
individual forms of intellectual vice. It seems that, at least in some cases, an intervention might earn 
its keep solely on the basis of performance outcomes that are only visible at the collective or social 
level of analysis. Inasmuch as we accept this to be the case, we should perhaps ask ourselves 
whether certain kinds of socio-economic, socio-political, and (to complete the picture) socio-
technical interventions should be adopted on the grounds that they trade collective forms of 
epistemic success for individual forms of intellectual vice. 
                                                          
10 Morton (2014) discusses a range of epistemic emotions within a broadly mandevillian framework. 
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4. Implications 
4.1. The Evaluation of Epistemic Technology 
In considering the way in which vice and virtue impact aspects of collective performance, it is natural 
for our attention to settle on the properties of individual human agents, for example, their cognitive 
capabilities. In an epistemological context, this focus is not surprising; for it is precisely these sorts of 
properties (i.e., the elements of cognitive character) that are the primary target of virtue 
epistemological theorizing. In many cases, however, epistemic goods (e.g., knowledge, true belief 
and understanding) are the product of processes that involve some form of technological resource. 
Palermos (2011) thus discusses the way in which the production of astronomical knowledge is tied to 
the skilful use of a variety of technological artefacts (e.g., telescopes). Our evaluations of positive 
epistemic status, in this case, are grounded, Palermos argues, in the way in which scientific 
instruments are used to drive belief-forming processes. In attributing a scientist with knowledge, we 
thus appeal to the explanatory role of a cognitive ability that (in most real-world cases) involves the 
technological resource as an intrinsic part of an extended cognitive process (see Palermos, 2011, 
2015). Such forms of epistemically-relevant bio-technological coupling are, of course, a common 
feature of contemporary scientific practice. In the absence of a proper grasp of how to use an array 
of increasingly sophisticated technological artefacts and systems, it is unlikely that any scientist 
would be able to reliably track the truth in their respective domain of interest. 
The upshot of all this is to highlight the importance of technologies relative to our individual and 
collective doxastic endeavours. In view of this importance, it seems appropriate to subject 
technologies to a degree of epistemic evaluation; i.e., it seems that we ought to judge the merits of a 
particular technology based on the extent to which it enhances the epistemic standing of its users. 
The problem, of course, is that with the notion of mandevillian intelligence now at hand, it seems 
entirely possible that the epistemic impact of a technology may differ depending on whether our 
attention is focused on the individual or the collective level of analysis. We can thus imagine a case 
in which a technology works against the epistemic interests of the individual but nevertheless 
confers an epistemic advantage to the larger community. 
To help make this a little clearer, consider the case of personalized search, as supported by popular 
Internet search engines such as Google Search. Personalized search helps to tailor search results to 
the interests and concerns of a particular Internet user based on their previous history of search 
engine use. The search engine is, in this case, acting as a form of bio-external attentional filter, 
directing a user’s attention to those regions of the online environment that are deemed to be of 
greatest interest and relevance. The danger, of course, is that this mechanism works to selectively 
alter the accessibility of online information in a manner that is aligned with a set of pre-existing 
interests, beliefs, and (perhaps) prejudices. As a result, we encounter the notorious problem of 
“filter bubbles” (Pariser, 2011). These undoubtedly limit a user’s access to epistemically-relevant 
information, but they do so in such a way that (at least in the worst case) ignores a range of 
important epistemic desiderata, such as reliability, objectivity, credibility, scope and truth (see Miller 
and Record, 2013). The concern, then, is that personalized search exerts something of a pernicious 
influence on our epistemic standing. It is for this reason that epistemologists such as Simpson (2012) 
and Miller and Record (2013) advocate changes in user behaviour and corporate policy, potentially 
backed up by government intervention, as a means of reducing the negative impact of personalized 
search engine technology on our (individual) epistemic capabilities. 
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It is here that the notion of mandevillian intelligence helps to reshape (or at least refocus) the nature 
of the epistemological debate. For even if we accept that personalized search is, in general, injurious 
to an individual’s epistemic health, this does not mean that the technology is bereft of any kind of 
epistemic benefit. In particular, it is far from clear that the epistemic consequences of search engine 
technology for a community of Internet users is exactly the same as that for the individual members 
of the community itself. We might, for example, claim that the use of personalized search plays a 
productive role in maintaining a degree of cognitive diversity within a community of Internet users. 
Such diversity, we have seen, is often crucial in terms of enabling some collective, multi-agent 
ensemble to discover, resolve or otherwise track the truth in some domain of interest. In essence, 
what the notion of mandevillian intelligence gives us is a means of avoiding a rush towards 
premature judgements concerning the epistemic or veritistic (see Goldman, 1999, 2002) value of a 
technology. Just because a particular technology, such as personalized search, turns out to have little 
or no benefit at the level of individual agents, this does not mean that it has no benefits tout court.11 
The concept of mandevillian intelligence can thus be seen as a means of helping epistemologists 
remain open-minded12 about the epistemic significance of a technology and the kinds of 
interventions (e.g., government regulation) that might be required to ensure its ‘virtuous’ operation. 
4.2. The Engineering of Socio-Epistemic Systems 
Inasmuch as we accept the notion of mandevillian intelligence, it seems that the epistemic 
consequences of a particular technology or agent property may vary according to whether our 
attention is focused at the individual or collective level. In particular, mandevillian intelligence 
suggests that a technology (e.g., personal filtering) or agent property (e.g., dogmatism) that looks to 
harm the epistemic standing of an individual agent could also play a positive role in securing 
epistemic benefits at the level of social groups and socio-technical systems. This insight has 
important implications for how we evaluate the properties of agents and the technologies they use. 
It also, however, alters our view as to how we might engineer socio-technical systems so as to 
maximize their epistemic potential. In particular, if we accept the claim that individual cognitive 
vices can (on occasion) underwrite collective epistemic accomplishments, then it becomes possible 
to entertain the (otherwise outlandish) idea of a technology being used to exploit, accentuate, or 
even establish(!) an individual form of intellectual vice. This, of course, is largely counter to the way 
we think about the technology design process. In most cases, the aim of technology design is to 
enhance the cognitive and epistemic functioning of the individual by addressing cognitive limitations 
and reducing the incidence of cognitive bias. In fact, it seems odd (not to mention ethically 
questionable) to consider the prospect of designing a technology so as to capitalize on the 
availability of a form of individual cognitive vice: in general, it seems much more appropriate to 
focus one’s efforts on minimizing cognitive bias rather than exploiting, accentuating or even creating 
                                                          
11 This issue is of particular importance when one considers the criticisms levelled at major technology 
providers (e.g., Facebook and Google) by a number of political leaders 
(http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-37798762). The main value of mandevillian intelligence, in this 
respect, is that helps us see the current political debate as epistemologically deficient. In particular, it is 
unclear whether the criticisms of major technology vendors are justified in the absence of a clearer 
understanding of how personalized search mechanisms affect epistemic outcomes at both the individual and 
collective levels. 
12 The concept of mandevillian intelligence is, in this context, functioning as a form of ‘cognitive scaffold’ that 
helps to support a specific form of (meta-epistemological) intellectual virtue: one that is often deemed 
relevant to issues of positive epistemic standing in the case of individual agents (see Zagzebski, 1996). 
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it. But what if we were to encounter a form of cognitive bias that, while injurious to the epistemic 
interests of the individual, was nevertheless able to play a productive role in ensuring epistemic 
success at the collective level. In this case, we can surely ask ourselves to what extent our 
technology design efforts should attempt to exploit the bias, as opposed to always attempting to 
eradicate it. 
What all this amounts to, I suggest, is an approach to technology development that factors in the 
potential contribution of individual cognitive biases and processing limitations as a means of 
promoting, supporting, or enabling collective forms of cognitive and epistemic success. The general 
idea is that we should see the cognitive vices of the individual as a form of exploitable resource that 
can work to the overall cognitive and epistemic good of an agent community. It is in this sense that 
we can perhaps see individual cognitive vices as part of a suite of resources (a sort of ‘vice-kit’) that 
system developers can exploit as part of their efforts to engineer socio-epistemic systems. 
4.3. The Virtue-Theoretic Conception of Collective Knowledge 
Finally, we should ask ourselves to what extent the notion of mandevillian intelligence threatens to 
undermine or at least destabilize virtue-theoretic approaches to understanding knowledge. 
Inasmuch as we view vice and virtue as apt to change whenever we switch our epistemological gaze 
between the individual and the collective levels, does this call into question the explanatory appeal 
of intellectual virtue in accounting for the nature of knowledge? Such may indeed be the case if we 
accept that collective forms of knowledge are produced by the exercise of an individual’s ‘vicious’ 
intellectual character. If, for example, the true beliefs ascribed to an epistemic group agent are seen 
to result from the exercise of what, at the individual level, is regarded as an intellectual vice, then 
how can virtue epistemology claim to provide a generic account of knowledge, one that applies as 
much to collective forms of knowledge as it does to the sorts of knowledge ascribed to individual 
agents? 
In order to help us appreciate what is at stake, here, consider how we might seek to develop a virtue 
theoretic conception of so-called collective doxastic agents (Goldman, 2011) or epistemic group 
agents (Palermos and Pritchard, 2013; Palermos, 2015). In general, analyses of intellectual virtue 
have focused on individual agents and paid little attention to how notions of intellectual virtue might 
be applied to groups of individuals. An exception is an important body of work by Palermos and 
Pritchard (2013). They suggest that we can understand attributions of group-level knowledge (i.e., 
the claim that a group of agents, such as a scientific team, knows that p) from a virtue theoretic 
perspective. In particular, they suggest that we should see group-level or collective knowledge as 
resulting from the exercise of cognitive abilities that are ascribed to the group as a whole: 
...the collective cognitive success of believing the truth of some (scientific) 
proposition will...be significantly creditable to the group’s cognitive agency (i.e., 
the set of organismic cognitive faculties of its individual members). (p. 115) 
It is here that we encounter a potential problem. This is revealed by the fact that what Palermos and 
Pritchard (2013) are seeking to do is use an epistemic condition that was formulated in the context 
of individualistic analytic virtue epistemology in order to pin down the epistemic standing of a 
collective epistemic entity. The danger, of course, is that it is all too easy to fall into the trap of 
assuming that individual forms of intellectual virtue are necessary to account for collective 
knowledge. In the case of mandevillian intelligence, recall, it is individual vice that lies at the root of 
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collective forms of epistemic success. While Palermos and Pritchard stop short of claiming that the 
cognitive faculties of the group members need be of the virtuous variety, it is clearly tempting, given 
their appeal to a virtue-theoretic epistemic condition, to see the epistemic status of groups as 
grounded in the same sort of cognitive abilities (i.e., intellectual virtues) as those that determine the 
validity of epistemic attributions made in the case of individual agents. It should, however, be clear 
that this kind of claim is called into question by the notion of mandevillian intelligence. In particular, 
we should not assume that collective forms of intellectual virtue are necessarily rooted in the 
exercise of individual forms of intellectual virtue. Instead, the thing that makes some collective 
cognitive trait or cognitive faculty a virtue (i.e., the thing that makes a collective cognitive trait or 
faculty reliable) may very well turn out to be a cognitive trait or faculty that, at the individual level, 
has a much more vice-like feel to it. 
The extent to which all of this presents a problem for virtue epistemology is, for the time being at 
least, unclear. Inasmuch as epistemologists accept the notion of mandevillian intelligence, it seems 
they should avoid committing to the idea that collective knowledge is founded on individual forms of 
intellectual virtue. Even if this sort of claim has not (as yet) been made by the epistemological 
community, it is perhaps important to be aware of some of the theoretical pitfalls that lie on the 
philosophical road ahead. 
5. Conclusion 
Mandevillian intelligence is a form of collective intelligence in which individual cognitive 
shortcomings, limitations and biases play a positive functional role in yielding various forms of 
collective cognitive success. Transposed to the epistemological domain, mandevillian intelligence 
emerges as the idea that individual forms of intellectual vice can, on occasion, play a productive role 
in improving the epistemic performance of a multi-agent ensemble (e.g., a socio-epistemic system, a 
collective doxastic agent or an epistemic group agent). This, it should be clear, marks out an 
important area of the epistemological terrain that is of common interest to those working in virtue 
epistemology (Greco and Turri, 2012), social epistemology (Goldman and Whitcomb, 2011) and 
applied epistemology (Chase and Coady, forthcoming). In particular, the notion of mandevillian 
intelligence forces us to question the extent to which individual cognitive shortcomings should 
always be denigrated as forms of intellectual vice. While such shortcomings may work against the 
epistemic interests of the individual agent, they may also play a crucial role in enabling an epistemic 
community to track the truth in a reliable manner. This has potentially profound implications for the 
way we think about the epistemic value of a broad array of social and technological interventions. 
For example, it is now unclear whether we should view a technology (e.g., personalized search) as of 
limited epistemic value simply because it undermines the epistemic standing of individual agents: in 
some cases, it seems that a specific technology may work to the collective epistemic good of a 
community while simultaneously jeopardizing the epistemic standing of the community’s 
constituent members. This sort of conflict, with epistemic enhancement at one level implying 
epistemic diminishment at the other, may very well serve as a point of tension when it comes to the 
theoretical merger of virtue epistemology with social epistemology (see Palermos and Pritchard, 
2013). It also, no doubt, serves as a potent form of dialectical fodder for those who are concerned 
with the application of epistemological theorizing to real-world situations (see Chase and Coady, 
forthcoming). 
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All of this should help to convince us of the relevance of mandevillian intelligence to contemporary 
epistemology. Clearly, much more work needs to be done to evaluate the notion of mandevillian 
intelligence. It will, in particular, be important to develop a better understanding of the sorts of 
situations in which individual vice contributes to collective virtue. It will also be important to 
undertake studies that reveal something about the nature of the processes involved in translating 
individual vice into collective virtue. Even in the absence of these studies, however, the notion of 
mandevillian intelligence can play an important role in highlighting a host of issues that lie at the 
interface of the epistemological sub-disciplines of virtue, social and applied epistemology. It is for 
this reason, I suggest, that the notion of mandevillian intelligence is worthy of further consideration 
by the epistemological community. 
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